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Abstract 
Politicians tend to use the word opportunity as a catch-all term. This paper is contending that 
opportunities can be classified as tangible or intangible. Lawmakers do not appear to consider the 
idea that opportunities are hierarchical or link to a firms’ ability to leverage opportunities. The context 
for the paper is Brexit and its strategic implications. Furthermore, a hard Brexit will throw up more 
intangible opportunities than tangible opportunities, which suggests that firms will require different 
strategies for hard Brexit and soft Brexit environments. This paper suggests that there are two possible 
dominant strategies available to executives, namely leverage logic and opportunity logic, and the 
application of the strategies is dependent on the type of Brexit situation. The time horizon to develop 
and refine the dominant strategies is dependent on the type of Brexit environment, with a hard Brexit 
requiring the longest time horizon.   
Keywords: Opportunities, strategy, decision-making, environmental scanning, industry entry, Brexit  
Key terms and definitions 
Brexit – the leaving of a country from a trade block union to form bi-lateral 
agreements 
Competitive advantage – ability to outperform competitors and create additional 
value 
Environmental changes – changes that occur in the business environment beyond 
the control of the organisation 
Opportunity – leverage strategies that the organisation can use to exploit trends and 
opportunities in the business environment 
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Political uncertainty – impact of government decision making, which causes many 
unknowns to be generated 
Referendum – vote given to the people in a country to decide on a political policy or 
action 
Resources and competences – assets that can be exploited to bring efficiency to 
the organisation, and competences are the ability to apply techniques and skills in 
different situations 
Strategic planning – formulating a process to analyze the business environment 
that is beneficial to the organisation 
Strategy – future direction of the organisation and where the organisation wants to 
be 
The 2016 Referendum called by the Conservative United Kingdom (UK) government 
was to decide whether to stay in the European Union (EU) or leave. Thus the 
referendum was a binary choice: leave or remain. Different political narratives have 
evolved to give context to the different sides of the political event. The outcome of this 
important event was a victory for the leave-side of the campaign. According to the 
‘Leavers’ the victory meant the UK should exit the EU as a clean break, i.e. with or 
without a deal. The idea of a political exit without a deal gave rise to the name ‘hard 
Brexit’. Leaving with a deal is designated a ‘soft Brexit’. One of the many differences in 
political ideology between the two camps is the idea of taking back control from the 
EU. The ‘Remainers’ suggested control could be modified by working within the EU. 
Associated with leaving the EU in the eye of the Leavers is the ability to set trade deals 
and be free from the EU laws. This paper will focus on the idea that freedom from the 
EU will allow the UK to secure trade deal opportunities beyond the EU, and that these 
would be numerous and advantageous. This narrative gives rise to the mindset that the 
freedom to strike trade deals, independent of the EU, would bring more trade 
opportunities to the country. At the time of writing this paper the UK has secured seven 
continuity trade deals from a target of 40, with the Pacific Islands, Israel, the 
Palestinian Authority, Switzerland, The Faroe Islands, Eastern and Southern Africa 
and Chile. 
The state of the Brexit debate is that the UK will leave the EU. Leaving the EU is under 
the terms of the EU Withdrawal Agreement. The agreement has been put to the UK 
Parliament twice and has been rejected (by enormous margins) on both occasions. An 
attempt by the government to bring the EU Withdrawal Agreement to the UK 
Parliament again for a third time was ruled inadmissible by the Speaker of the House. 
However, if there is a major change to the EU Withdrawal Agreement the Speaker of 
the House will allow a third vote. The Speaker of the House determines if the EU 
Withdrawal Agreement has undergone significant changes so as to be deemed a new 
bill. There are plans to bring the bill to the UK Parliament again just before the UK is 
due to leave the EU on 29 March 2019. Unfortunately, the UK Parliament cannot agree 
on an alternative to the government’s EU Withdrawal Agreement. Consequently, the 
government has applied to the EU for a short extension to Article 50, until June 2019. 
This is still under consideration by the EU, but the expectation is that it will be granted. 
Where does this leave Brexit? Several options have been mentioned. These options 





the UK Parliament wrest control of the Brexit process from the government and vote 
on a number of indicative scenarios e.g. second referendum, Norway style agreement 
with the EU. There is no appetite for leaving the EU with a no deal, but this could 
become a default outcome due to the complexity of the process. There is also a 
possibility that the UK remains in the EU (preferred option by the EU). The outcome 
of Brexit is inconclusive: the three actors – UK Parliament, UK government and the 
EU need to reach a consensus. 
The word “opportunity” when used colloquially gives the impression that there is no 
need to qualify an opportunity. This is certainly how politicians use the word, which is 
different from how businesses would use it. In the business world opportunities must 
be qualified, because not all opportunities are exploitable, but how opportunity is used 
by politicians, especially in relation to Brexit, gives the impression that all 
opportunities are exploitable or are equal. The use of the word opportunity is 
exaggerated, and gives people a false impression of beneficial choices. Opportunity can 
be “tangible” or “intangible”, and these two options are at the opposite end of the 
opportunity continuum. Tangible opportunities are exploitable, and have a good 
degree of success, whilst intangible opportunities are likely to be unsuccessful, because 
the ability to exploit them is lacking in some way. Both tangible and intangible 
opportunities are strategic in nature, but tangible opportunities are more likely to be 
successful based on a firm’s capability. The risk associated with exploiting tangible 
opportunities is much lower than that of intangible opportunities. Leavers argue that 
freedom to make trade deals independent of the EU will lead to more opportunities, 
i.e. tangible opportunities. 
Tangible opportunities will enable firms to apply their existing competencies in a soft 
Brexit environment, with minimal recombination. The level of adaptability required 
for a hard Brexit environment will require a substantial rethink on how a firm can 
remain competitive. The agricultural industry could be devastated, because the 
industry receives significant subsidies from the EU and the UK government will find it 
challenging to match the subsidies the industry currently enjoys. If a hard Brexit is the 
outcome, the government is suggesting tariffs could be zero for many agricultural 
imports, which would impact the industry severely. The agricultural industry would 
enjoy more tangible opportunities in a soft Brexit world, because the ruggedness of the 
business environment would be based on an incremental change, and not a 
transformational change that would exist in the hard Brexit environment. Tangible 
opportunities will still exist in the hard Brexit environment, but the recombination of 
the competencies will require an elongated window of opportunity, i.e. it will take 
longer for competitors to find a suitable strategic position in a hard Brexit 
environment. This will necessitate different strategies such as partnerships or 
collaborations with firms inside and outside the UK. Some universities have formed 
relationships with EU universities to maintain access to EU funding for research and 
signal to EU students that they can continue to study in the UK. Kings College, Warwick 
University and LSE are some of the first to adopt a first mover strategy with 
partnerships with EU universities. The financial services industry has adopted a 
similar strategy to the universities. It entails the banks moving parts of their business 
to EU countries to enable continued business interaction with the EU. These are 
precautions to offset the impact of a hard Brexit, because of the uncertainty 
surrounding the Brexit event. Even the government has reached side-deals with the 
EU for pharmaceutical products from the UK to be compliant with EU law. 
Conclusively, a hard Brexit will include more intangible opportunities and to exploit 
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them successfully will require firms to consider different methods of strategies. These 
would range from joint ventures, partnerships, collaboration to creating subsidiaries 
in the EU.  
Without analysis of forecast environmental trends the scope to define effective 
opportunities is limited. There is a tendency to treat opportunities as strategies, and 
link them to the firm or consider them as strengths, without scanning the environment 
(Siciliano, 2016). Favorable environmental trends give rise to “tangible opportunities”. 
The indicators to exploit favorable environmental trends form a focus of this paper. 
The literature uses the resource-based view (RBV), and Blue Ocean and strategic 
positioning are frameworks that aid understanding of the factors that contribute to 
tangible opportunities (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005; Peteraf, 1993; Barney, 1991; Porter, 
1996). However, uncertainty in the environment could influence the effectiveness of 
the application of these frameworks, and thus question the importance of the 
indicators used to define the quality of the opportunity or whether to classify the 
opportunity as a tangible opportunity. A clean break from Europe is the requirement 
of a hard Brexit and entails leaving the European Union (EU) and single market. This 
will enable the UK to trade on World Trade Organization (WTO) regulations. However, 
a soft Brexit envisages the UK retaining some form of membership of the EU and that 
includes the single market and/or customs union. The various models will have an 
impact on economic growth, but soft Brexit will cause the least dislocation (BBC, 2016). 
Hard Brexit is non-alignment with EU trade regulations and processes, whereas soft 
Brexit is alignment with EU trade regulations and processes. Brexit is the elephant in 
the room that is the inspiration to write this paper and the context that surrounds it. 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the literature on identifying the salient factors 
(organisational processes, ability to learn and relearn, creative innovation, 
entrepreneurial action, resources and competences, stakeholder connectivity with 
firms, market entry before dominant technology is determined, market timing and 
ruggedness of the environment) that facilitate exploitable opportunities (tangible 
opportunities). It suggests that a hierarchical structure is required to examine the 
factors, and it is possible that the position of factors in the hierarchy may change due 
to environmental conditions. The paper further seeks to examine the role of intuition, 
gut feel or emotional intelligence in making an opportunity into a tangible opportunity. 
Theoretical framework: Timing opportunities 
The timing of an opportunity, e.g. to enter a market, will affect a firm’s performance, 
and presents key questions in strategy research (Mitchell, 1991). Levels of management 
innovation (Foster, 1986), and organisation theory (Hannan & Freeman, 1989) are 
influencers on the timing of opportunities. First mover advantage versus follower, i.e. 
order of entry (Lambkin, 1988) is linked to opportunity timing, but strategic capability 
also affects timing (Lee, 2009; Robinson, Fornell, & Sullivan, 1992). Entering “new” 
markets such as China, India, and Brazil etc. is not influence by time, for in two years 
the opportunities will be just as tangible as now in 2017. Politicians conveniently avoid 
the issue of timing when it comes to Brexit. Making plans for the tangible opportunities 
of today, with no certainty that those opportunities will be available in the future, is a 
risk. Put another way, the “window of opportunity” may not be around in the future 
(Suarez, Grodal, & Gotsopoulos, 2015:442). However, politicians consider 
opportunities and windows of opportunity with a degree of certainty based on rational 
behavior. Countries that we may want to trade with are strategies, not opportunities 





parts of the cycle has not been established. According to some authors timing 
advantages apply to stages in the industry cycle (Agarwal & Bayus, 2004; Markides & 
Geroski, 2005). Time of entry has also been linked to a firm’s capability (Lee, 2009). 
Timing is linked to credibility and legitimacy, which affect first mover advantage 
(Aldwich & Fiol, 1994; Dobrev & Gotsopoulos, 2005). Market timing is linked to 
technological uncertainty (Sorenson, 2000). Thus the optimal time to enter a market 
is still to be defined (Suarez & Lanzolla, 2007). Politicians conveniently forget or may 
not know that opportunities are influenced by many factors, some of which are 
explained above. Thus opportunities have to be qualified based on the state and 
influencers of the market and are not open to all firms or countries. 
Further developing the influence of industry cycle on market timing suggests that the 
initial phase is divergence and the final stage convergence (Suarez, Grodal, & 
Gotsopoulos, 2015). Divergence is associated with many stakeholders such as 
competitors, customers and differences in product design and functionality. In the 
ensuing stage after the initial stage a few firms start to become favorites due to the 
influences of stakeholders (Grodal, 2007; Kennedy, 2008; Suarez, Grodal, & 
Gotsopoulos, 2015). The number of market opportunity moves to an inverted U with 
time. This is associated with the dominant category, and does not depend upon the 
dominant technological design. Successful categories encourage information exchange 
due to the need of stakeholders to engage and communicate with other stakeholders, 
known as the sociocognitive construct (Suarez, Grodal, & Gotsopoulos, 2015). 
Emerging categories should be able to link with newness and novelty, which make the 
product distinctive to stakeholders, and should also be recognisable to be easily 
comprehensible (Bingham & Kahl, 2013). This creates an internal tension between the 
recognisable and newness and novelty, and requires a recombining of existing products 
in innovative ways, such as voicemail (Berger & Heath, 2005). Success of emerging 
categories depends upon dominant stakeholder endorsement (Negro, Kocak, & Hsu, 
2011), and is further qualified by current cultural acceptance or trends (Bingham & 
Kahl, 2013). However, the dominant technological design is established through 
experimentation (Saurez & Utterback, 1995). In the case of a novelty category any 
recombination that is practically permissible is possible (Suarez, Grodal, & 
Gotsopoulos, 2015). Emerging dominant categories can only occur when other 
categories are marginalised or the perception of them changes so that these competing 
perceptions of the industry are abandoned. Where the distance between emerging 
categories is great more interaction between stakeholders is required to reach a 
consensus. The time for dominant categories to appear in the early phases of an 
industry increases and includes a connected number of categories. The time required 
for the dominant category to emerge in the early phases of an industry increases with 
the distance between categories (Suarez, Grodal, & Gotsopoulos, 2015). 
Early entry into a market, known as first mover advantage, has several positives such 
as presumptive resource allocation (Carroll & Hannan, 1989), economies of scale in 
R&D and production (Dixit, 1985; Klepper, 2002), reputational advantage, which 
positively influences the customer’s ability to switch (Carpenter & Nakamoto, 1990), 
and networking (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1998). The counter-argument to these 
advantages includes the environmental and business uncertainties in the early stage of 
an industry (Suarez, Grodal, & Gotsopoulos, 2015). The uncertainty is across 
technological and consumer demand, before a dominant design is entrenched 
(Utterback, 1994; Sorenson, 2000). Early entrants also have to contend with 
uncertainty relating to the market itself, which is driven by the collective actions of 
Bowen, Bowen and Bowen, ANZJES 11(1) 
 
8 
stakeholders (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009; Rosa et al., 1999). Firms that enter after the 
emergence of a dominant category can focus on the “right” experimentation that is 
consistent with the dominant design and technology (Suarez, Grodal, & Gotsopoulos, 
2015). The window of opportunity that opens with the emergence of a dominant 
category remains available only for a limited time. The end of the window of 
opportunity is identified by the emergence of a dominant design, and the maturing 
industry forces concentration towards production considerations such as economies of 
scale (Suarez, Grodal, & Gotsopoulos, 2015; Gort & Klepper, 1982). This leads to a 
proposition that states “firms that enter during the time window between the 
emergence of the dominant category and emergence of a dominant design will tend to 
perform better than firms that enter during other phases” (Suarez, Grodal, & 
Gotsopoulos, 2015:443). It would suggest that a reasonable assumption is the number 
of established categories is greater than the emergent categories within countries. First 
mover advantage is thus limited in scope when considering market entry into different 
countries. Market entry will be in dominant categories with defined technological 
design facilitated by the stakeholders. From a politician’s perspective there are several 
opportunities, which are the sum of the emergent dominant categories and the 
established dominant categories. However, the window of opportunity is limited before 
industry maturity, which suggests that firms must enter countries and their markets 
sooner rather than later. This implies that the number of tangible opportunities 
(windows of opportunity available) is limited, and established dominant categories will 
tend to hold more intangible opportunities. According to Suarez, Grodal, and 
Gotsopoulos (2015), firms will seek to gain advantage in established categories to keep 
competitors out through deliberate actions and engagement with stakeholders. Firms 
need to create and seek emerging dominant categories to drive growth and to obtain 
market leadership positions. 
The challenge for firms is to enter before the start of the emergent dominant category 
is in place, which will require research on windows of opportunity in new markets. To 
define the end-point of the window of opportunity many suggestions have surfaced 
from emergence of a dominant design (technological influence), which causes a shift 
in competition, to economies of scale and production process (Klepper, 1997; 
Utterback, 1994). Defining the start of an emerging category is far more challenging. 
One suggestion by Christensen, Suarez, and Utterrback (1999) is that the window of 
opportunity for entering an industry happens “during the period just prior to the 
emergence of a dominant product design” (p. 213). Markides and Geroski (2005) 
suggest that “fast-second” firms enter an industry “just when the dominant design is 
about to emerge” (p. 120). Specific guidelines based on quantitative analysis were 
suggested by Agarawal and Bayus, (2004) and Lee (2009) by counting the number of 
firms entering the industry before take-off, firms that enter between propelling sales 
and take-off in the number of firms, and finally firms entering after the propelling 
increase in sales. Statistical techniques using discriminant analysis give results that 
vary between industries (Agarwal & Gort, 2001). A firm proactively inviting 
stakeholders to engage in a new category by drawing them away from an established 
category is taking a risky strategy, because the firm is attempting to draw stakeholders 
towards their perception of the industry (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). The firm must 
execute a strategy that demonstrates consistency of product positioning, and also by 
moulding stakeholders’ perceptions (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009).   





Managers are required to interpret varying environmental signals and link the analysis 
to the strategic impact on their firm, including how it affects the firm’s performance 
(Dutton, Fahey, & Narayanan, 1983). One expectation is that managers can condense 
complex environmental situations into meaningful simple interpretations such as 
whether the environment harbours any threats or opportunities (Jackson & Dutton, 
1987; Julian & Ofori-Dankwa, 2008). Strategic issues require interpretation of 
organisational action and decision-making (Gilbert, 2006; Julian & Ofori-Dankwa, 
2008). Opportunities are associated with strategic issues and thus tangible 
opportunities are a function of the resources and competences of the firm. One cannot 
then talk about blanket opportunities as politicians tend to when stating that the whole 
world has opportunities. One firm’s meat could be another firm’s poison. Reasoning 
using analogies is based on past experience that could be applied to similar situations, 
enabling inferences to be drawn about a present situation (Holyoak, 2005). Strategists 
apply analogical reasoning in novel environments (Gavetti & Rivikin, 2005; 2007). 
Researchers go further to contend that analogical reasoning helps organisational 
adaption in complex environments (Gavetti, Levinthal, & Rivikin, 2005). Environment 
scanning provides the data, but managers need to provide the meaning to facilitate 
learning and organisational action. The current environment and staff of the 
organisation and its collective past experiences are part of the process in 
understanding the current environment (Daft & Weck, 1984). Consequently, strategic 
issues apply inferential reasoning to generate fallible hypotheses instead of drawing 
conclusions (Dutton, Fahey, & Narayanan, 1983). Hypotheses inferred from the 
analysis guide managers through the decision-making process to realise perceived 
opportunities in the environment (Eisenhardt & Sull, 2001). Opportunities need 
qualifying, and as suggested, Eisenhardt and Sull (2001) are referring to tangible 
opportunities. Environmental scanning more precisely needs to clearly identify 
tangible and intangible opportunities, which implies a hierarchical approach to seeking 
and exploiting opportunities. 
The literature has established a link between strategic issues and the following 
organisational characteristics, such as strategy and information processing structure 
and culture (Thomas & McDaniel, 1990), diversity of the top management team 
(Plambeck & Weber, 2009), resource dependencies (Milliken, 1990), and experience, 
inertia and available resources (Denison et al., 1996). Further organisational links 
include the importance of information gathering and processing (Anderson & Nichols, 
2007) and past experience (Denison et al., 1996; Plambeck & Weber, 2010). Wholey 
and Brittain (1989) suggest that environmental variation has dimensions classified as 
frequency (time between environmental changes), amplitude (the distance between 
successive changing environmental states), and predictability (the degree to which 
future states can be anticipated).  
Jackson and Dutton (1988) suggest environments are classified as favorable or 
unfavorable, which are broad indicators and need refining to improve their accuracy. 
Miller and Lin (2014) advance environmental indicators beyond those suggested by 
Jackson and Dutton (1988). Miller and Lin (2014) draw several conclusions from their 
research on interpreting environments by reasoning analogically: 
1. The level of interpretation accuracy improves over time for best available match 
and exact match. However, old memories often interfere in the interpretation 
process, and often mislead organisations that are self-satisficing in what is 
acceptable to the organisation. Satisficing organisations in dynamic 
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environments should be abandoned in favor of the best match from analogical 
reasoning. 
2. Dynamic environments reduce a firm’s performance in the short term, but 
enhance experiential learning, thus improving the accuracy of analogical 
reasoning to the best available match over the long term. This conclusion is 
consistent with research by Gary, Wood, and Pillinger (2012). Miller and Lin 
(2014) also found that new entrants that enter dynamic environments invest 
heavily in learning, but receive weak results in the short run. Constantly 
challenging the environments via participation gives rise to unique knowledge, 
which enables them to cope with environmental dynamism. 
3. Best matches generally outperform exact match reasoning when the dimensions 
of unpredictability and ruggedness (the extent to which interactions among 
environmental elements affect the resulting state) are high. When experience is 
limited, decision-making needs to use what is known, and not wait to acquire 
the ideal know-how. This is a probable situation in the case of a hard Brexit, 
because to make effective decisions about tangible opportunities will require 
acting on what the organization knows when entering new markets and 
industries. The Brexiteers (who voted to leave the EU) are correct that in the 
long term market entries will become tangible opportunities. How long will it 
take to develop the level of analogical reasoning?   
4. In environments that have a high degree of ruggedness, satisficing can deliver 
results that are worse than random guessing. Thus satisficing is sensible in the 
early stages of environments with low unpredictability or low frequency of 
change. Only in stable or predictable environments should satisficing be 
accommodated, otherwise satisficing should be abandoned in favor of 
inferential reasoning. 
5. Satisficing is an approach to reduce performance volatility when environmental 
change occurs infrequently, but the penalty is that lower risk comes with a cost 
to performance. Organisations that are extremely risk averse would accept the 
trade-off of risk-return involving satisficing over the long run. 
Competitive advantage and sustainable opportunities 
The resource-based view is a significant theoretical framework in understanding 
competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984; Peteraf, 1993; Peteraf & 
Barney, 2003). The sustainability of competitive advantage is in linked resources that 
are valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable (VRIN) for a given industry or 
market (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). Competitors with similar resources may not be 
able to apply VRIN successfully to gain a competitive advantage. The window of 
opportunity becomes activated at the emergence of the dominant category, and it is 
suggested that at this stage a competitive advantage could be created and extended. 
Firms need to develop resources at the early dominant category or at the window of 
opportunity based on the VRIN framework. Competitive advantage does not last 
forever but is affected by environmental dynamics and complexity, which by 
implication will influence the application of VRIN.  
The leveraging of core resources based on the RBV approach is another approach to 
gaining a competitive advantage (Hamel & Prahalad, 1990; Collis & Montgomery, 
1995). Ownership of the core resources is how the competitive advantage is derived, 
these specific resources being rare, non-substitutable and valued in one or several 





complementary resources linked to the core resources. It may not be sufficient to own 
core resources to leverage a competitive advantage across markets or industries 
(Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2007). Gilbert (2006) found in a study that complementary 
resources were necessary in the newspaper industry in the online as well as traditional 
newspaper markets. The recombination effect of core resources and complementary 
resources is a way forward for the Brexit environment, and the mixture only requires 
moderate linkage between them (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2007). This assumes that 
changes in the Brexit environment can be compensated by a firm’s knowledge-based 
leverage of the expertise to gain a competitive advantage. If the firm is dependent on 
physical resources, the leveraging approach to competitive advantage will be short-
term (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2007; Danneels, 2002). 
Opportunity logic comes from a firm’s ability to capture attractive and fast-moving 
opportunities based on its resources to create superior value (Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000). To unlock the Brexit opportunities will require an entrepreneurial approach by 
firms, coupled with innovative ideas. Seizing these opportunities requires the 
application of one or more organisational processes, from the ability to master mergers 
and acquisitions, alliances and internationalisation and product innovation 
(Eisenhardt & Sull, 2001). Attractive opportunities are those with the highest profit 
and revenues, because these are a measure of superior performance (Davis, 
Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2007). In the context of this paper, attractive opportunities 
are tangible opportunities, but intangible opportunities can be converted into tangible 
opportunities with the “right” resources. Intangible opportunities will require 
reworking of organisational processes to convert them into tangible or attractive 
opportunities. Firms in the Brexit environment will have to redesign organisational 
processes, and these will need to evolve to meet the changing environment of Brexit. 
The uncertainty that Brexit is creating is making designing organisational processes 
and identifying tangible opportunities more challenging. Because opportunity logic 
requires flexibility in organisational processes they are semi-structured compared to 
leverage opportunity logic, which requires less flexibility in the organisational 
processes (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2007; Nelson & Winters, 1982). Opportunity logic 
requires management to identify opportunities spontaneously in unpredictable and 
non-linear environments (Davis, Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2007). To exploit tangible 
opportunities in a Brexit-type environment executives should deploy an opportunity 
logic strategy, especially in a hard Brexit environment. However, in a soft Brexit 
environment a leveraging opportunity strategy would be a more effective strategy. 
However, this should not stop the search for spontaneous opportunities in a soft Brexit 
environment.  
Implications for Management 
The above discussion on competitive advantage has implications for Brexit. A hard 
Brexit effectively changes the environmental landscape by adding to the complexity 
and dynamics in the EU markets and industries for UK firms and also overseas firms 
operating from the UK. A degree of relearning of a firm’s strategy will be required, 
which will impact how tangible opportunities can be exploited. Firms will be effectively 
trying to recalculate their competitive advantage and realign it with the new 
environmental reality. This is equivalent to trying to re-enter dominant categories that 
are already established. An appropriate strategy is to use the Blue Ocean strategy 
canvas or scan the environment for white spaces to innovate to create new emergent 
categories. This will require UK firms to become innovator-engines and become more 
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responsive to tangible and intangible opportunities, creating more first-mover tangible 
opportunities. 
Does this mean that a soft Brexit spikes the innovator-engines less? In one sense this 
could be true, because there is a need to work harder with a hard Brexit than a soft 
Brexit situation. However, the hard work required by a hard Brexit is related to 
retaining a firm’s competitive position and not to improvement. Soft Brexit tangible 
opportunities are linked to future growth on top of existing growth, and strengthening 
VRIN factors to develop new or additional sustainability relative to existing 
competitors. Improvement in competitive advantage and sustainability of competitive 
advantage is relatively short-term in a soft Brexit environment, but a hard Brexit 
requires the competitive advantage calculus to be recalculated and this could be over 
the medium to long term.  
Parnell and Dent (2009) suggest that at the beginning stages of a new emergent 
category initial success is required to achieve long-term success. Hard Brexit is the 
equivalent for UK operators of entering a market or industry at the beginning, because 
of the new environment and they are at the initial stages of this new environment. 
Environmental changes in a hard Brexit require more chances to be taken with tangible 
opportunities, and for them to be successful a greater degree of adaptability and 
flexibility is required. Tangible opportunities are based on a hierarchy as the literature 
suggests that emergent categories are more fruitful than entering established or 
mature markets (Suarez, Grodal, & Gotsopoulos, 2015). The levels of certainty, 
complexity and stability influence the approaches employed to develop the “best” 
strategy to exploit tangible opportunities. An opportunity (tangible opportunity) logic 
to creating value and building a competitive advantage will require an entrepreneurial 
and innovative approach by firms.  
Executives have two strategies available to cope with a Brexit environment. Leverage 
opportunity strategies are the dominant strategies for a soft Brexit to exploit tangible 
opportunities, but this is not to preclude logic opportunity strategies. In a hard Brexit 
environment a logic opportunity strategy would be the dominant strategy. Logic 
strategy will give firms the opportunity to redesign their organisational processes. All 
strategies require a degree of flexibility, but operating a dominant strategy that is logic 
opportunity-centric will require a greater degree of flexibility and adaptability than 
leverage opportunity strategies.  
Future Research 
The impact of Brexit, be it soft or hard, is likely to make UK firms innovative-engines 
and become greater risk-takers in innovative terms. Will Brexit move the UK towards 
a long-term approach to investment and innovation? An associated area is the cultural 
effects of Brexit on strategy development and strategy implementation. Opportunities 
that are not currently exploitable by a firm, known as intangible opportunities, will 
require strategies to bring them back into play for the firms. What strategies are 
appropriate to achieve this outcome? 
Conclusion 
Opportunities require classifying into tangible or intangible; to speak of opportunities 





There are windows of opportunity in emergent categories and the best stage to be 
successful in that market or industry. Hard Brexit will contain intangible opportunities 
and soft Brexit will include tangible opportunities, but they are not mutually exclusive. 
Some firms will have core resources and competences to succeed in a hard Brexit 
environment, but these are likely to be limited. Windows of opportunity are rather like 
once-in-a-lifetime opportunities. Entering an established or mature industry is 
challenging, because the stakeholders have decided the shape of the industry. Hard 
Brexit will require more prising open of established markets than a soft Brexit. 
Strategies will be required to minimise the effects of Brexit, but a possible approach is 
to recombine core resources and complementary competences to derive and develop 
new positions of competitive advantage. 
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